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REPORTS OF CASES 
DETERM.INED IN 
THE SUPREME COURT 
OJ' TBB 
STATE OF CALIFORNIA 
(Orim. No. 4864. In Bank. Nov. 1, 1948.) 
THE PEOPLE, Respondent, v. REBEL B. CORNETT, 
Appellant. 
[1] Romicide-Instruct1on8-Self-defense.-An instruction in • 
murder case that, to justify a killing in self-defense, it mU!lt 
appear that the killing WIUI "absolutely necesbary" should not 
be used, even if the quoted words are preceded by th., qU'lllliea-
tion that it must appear to defend:tnt's comprehension, as a 
reasonable man, thnt the killing was neCCf:lSllrr to l!void d1l.n~r, 
since such instruction miJ;ht iudicate to the jury that the right 
to self-defense is avaibble only where the J:ilIing- is !\hsolutell 
necessary to sllve life. 
[I] Oriminal Law - Instructions - Cautionary - Admissions.-
Where the prosecution in a murder case rdics on evid"nce of 
iefendant's oral admissions, an instruction to view SUI'.h nd-
missions with CAution should be given in view of Ccxlo CiT. 
Pree., § 2061(4). 
[3] Romicide-Instructions-Murder-Intent.-In a murder CIlP', 
it is error to give an instruction that there Deed be no appn-
eiable space of time betvrecn the intent to kill an.l the nv..,rt 
act, that a man may do a thing deliber~tely from Il moment's 
reflection as well as after pondering over the subjcd for a 
month or a year, and that he can premeditate the moment h .. 
[1] See 13 CaI.Jur. 632; 26 Am.Jur. 537. 
[2] See 8 Cal.Jur. 305; 53 Am.Jur. 481. 
licK. Dig. Referenccs: [1] Homicide, § 208; [2] Criminl1l Law, 
1691; [3] Homicide, §185; [4,8] Homicide, §268; [5,7] ilOD&i-
cide, 229(1); [6] Homicide, 1 H3. 
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conr.eives the purpose, since the instruction rliminat .. s tho 
necessity for deliberation or pr~m(\ditation in forming tho 
intent and hence substantially deletes the difference between 
first and second degree murder. 
(4) Id.-Appe:J.I-Harmless an.l Reversible Error-Instructlons.-
In a homicide case, an instruction which properly states thllt 
the Inw does not undertake to measure the length of the period 
during which a thought must be pondered before it can ripen 
into an intent to kill which is deliberate and premeditated, 
and that the true test is nut the dura~ion of time but the extent 
of the reflection, did not otH'rate to cure the error in a preced-
ing instruction that a man may do a thing deliberately and 
intentionally froc a moment's reflection, where the evidence 
was conJicting as to whether the murder was of the first or 
second degree, and where the jury might have been misled by 
the erroneous instruction. 
[6] Id.-Instructions-Burden of Proof-Mitigation.-In a mur-
der case, it is error to give an instruction in the lunguage of 
Pen. Code, § 1105, relating to burden of proof of circumstances 
in mitigation, since the code section does not set forth a rule 
relating to the burden of proof, but merely declares a rule of 
procedure that imposes on the defendant only a duty of going 
forward with the evidence of mitigating circumstances. 
(6) Id.-Burden of Proof-Mitigation.-A defendant charJ'l!d with 
murder is not required to prove mitigating circumst:mcell by a 
prepondl!rance of the evidence, but need only introduce evi-
dence of such circumstances to raise a reasonable doubt of his 
guilt. 
[7] Id.-Instructions-Burden of Proof-Mitigation.-In a homi-
cide cllse, an instruction in the language of Pen. Code, § 1105, 
is erroneous where the jury is not fully advised that such an 
instruction has no applicll.tion in determining the degree of 
murder, Rnd that it is applicable only in determining whether 
the homicide constitutes murder or manslaughter, or is justifi-
able or excu,;able. I 
[8] Id.-AplK'al-Harmless and Reversible Error-Instructions.-
In a murder ease, an erroneous instruction in the languag'e of 
Pen. Code, § 1105, was not cured by instructions rclnting to 
the presumption of innocence and the burden of the prosecu-
tion to prove every element of the crime beyond a reason:tble 
doubt, where these instructions were not given in connection 
with those relating to the mitigating circumst:lDces and hence 
did not clarify the confusion likely to result from the reading 
of the code section, and where, moreover, defendant admitted 
the killing and claimed that the shooting was done in self-
dcfenHe, since in such case he was required by the erroneous 
instruction to produce more evidence than the law demands to 
establish this defense. 
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APPEAL (automatically taken unl.kr Pen. Code, § 12:39) 
from a .iuuglllCnt of the Superior Court of Tulare County and 
from an order denying a new trial. Frederick E. Stone, Judge. 
Reversed. 
Prosecntion for murder. Judgment of conviction imposing 
the death pen'aIty, reversed. 
Edward M. Raskin, under appointment by the Supreme 
Court, for Appellant. 
Fred N. Howser, Attorney General, and Frank RiehardR, 
Deputy Attorney General, for Respondent. 
TR.A YNOR, J.-Defendant was charged with the murder 
of Fred Weaver Cole, the stepfather of his divorced wife. A 
jury found him guilty of murder in the first degr('e nnd m:!dc 
no recommendation as to penalty. The trial court denied his 
motion for a new trial and seLtcnced him to death. This is 
an automatic appe:u from the judgment imposing the death 
penalty. (Pen. Code, § 1239 (b).) 
The circumstances of the homicide, according to the testi-
mony of the witnesses for the prosecution, were: At the time 
of the homicide defendant, a pipe yard worker, \vas living 
with his divorced wife, Pauline Cornett, and their eight 
children in a one-room cabin in a labor camp at Woodlake, 
California. On September 28, 1947, defendant was seeking 
employment for his children in the cotton fields and had 
returned to the cabin at 3 o'clock in the afternoon. Mrs. Cor-
nett was then preparing dinner; several of the children were 
in the cabin, while the others were outside. After defenoant 
entered the cabin an argument immediately took pbee be-
tween him and Mrs. Cornett. She accused him of drinking, 
and he cursed her repeatedly; he repeated that hf' was "going 
to get" her and the "entire bunch" including t hc decedent. 
Shortly after, she left the room to avoid him and went into the 
lavatory. Finally she went out of the house and concealed her-
self behind buildings near by so thlat he would not be able to 
find her. Meanwhile, defendant secured a Japanese Luger from 
his bed and placed it under his shirt; after utteriug' words 
to the effect that he was going to get drunk, he left the cabin 
" and drove away in his automobile. Thereafter a neighbor took 
Mrs. Cornett and seven of her children to the home of the 
decedent in Exeter. Upon their arrival Mrs. Cornett related to 
) 
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the decedent what had occurred at the cabin at Woodlake, 
whereupon the decedent secured two pistols and placed them 
under his shirt. She and the children went into the house, 
while he waited on the front porch. A short time later defend-
ant arrived in his automobile. By this time all the children 
except Virginia, aged 15, had gone upstairs: Virginia and 
Mrs. Cornett remained in the front room in order to observe 
through the window the two men outside. After talking to tbl! 
dc('euent for a few moments, defendant approached thc front 
door and said, .. Come on out, Mom, you are in trouble." lirH. 
Cornett then rushed out of the front room and departed 
from the house througb the rear door. She entered the house· 
:>f a neighbor, where she remained until ~he heard a shot 
coming from the upstairs room of the decedent's honse. As 
hoth defendant and decedent entert.-d the house, Virginia 
ran upstairs. 
Defendant proceeded up the stairs, and the decedent fol-
lowed several steps behind. Neither defendant nor the dece-
dont held a gun in his hands as he ascended. At this time 
Virginia was sitting on the window sill behind a dresser, 
which was located near the head of the stairs; Letta, aged 13, 
was standing at the head of the stairway, whil£' Jamt'S, a~l'd 
10, was behind a sewing machine; the younger children were 
~Ilaying on the floor. When the men arrived at the head of 
the stairs defendant said to the decedent, "You better drllw, 
this is your last draw." As they entered the room defendant 
a .. ~ked him if he )mew where Mrs. Cornett had gone, and he 
replied that he didn't know. Thereupon defendant looked 
behind a dressing screen, apparently seeking Mrs. Cornett, 
and then removing his gun from his shirt, whirled around 
and shot the decedent, who at that time was standing sideways 
to "him about lI.ve" feet "away. The decedent caught bimself on 
a chair. Defendant then said, "II am going to Visalia anil give 
llP" ; the decedent said, "I will go with you." Defendant 
replied, "No, you are not," and approaching the deCt.'Cient 
very closely tired a second shot into his stomach. This time 
the decedent fell to the floor. After removing the decedent's 
two guns from his shirt, defendant went downstairs and placed 
one of the decedent's guns in the front room. Taking the otber 
two guns with him, he drove away in bis automobile. 
Defendant was apprehended a short time later in Woodlake 
by Chief of Police Borgman and Police Officer Bolen of 
Exeter, who testified as follows: After Cbief Borgulan hkd 
called at the residence of the decedent to inVel>ti!;:lh; the 
Nov. 1948] PI£OPI,!': V. CORXE'" 
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shooting, he and Officer Bolen immediately proceeded to Wood-
lake, where they \vere joined by the chief of police of Wood-
lake. They proceeded to defendant's cabin but found no 
one there. As they were about to leave, however, they saw 
defendant's car approaching and awaited his arrival. AI de-
fondant stepped out of his ear, the three officers pointed their 
gUllS at him and ordered him repeatedly to drop his gun. 
Def('ndant at first ignored their orders, but finally dropped 
the gun on the third command. The officers immediately 
searched him and fouud the Luger under his shirt. As they 
were taking defendant to Visalia he asked, • 'How is he Y , , 
Chief Borman replied, "He was still alive when we left town,. 
but he has probably passed away now." Defendant then said, 
"Good, I have been wanting to do this for a long time. " 
The circumstances of the killing according to the testi-
mony of defendant were: On the morning of September 28, 
after placing his Luger in his shirt, he left the cabin at 
11 :20 to seek employment for his children. After he had 
returned in the afternoon, Mrs. Cornett began to accuse 
him of drinking, but he told her that he had not been drinking. 
He was not angry; he warned her, however, t.hat if she con-
tinued to accuse him he would,..go to town to obtain a drink. 
He departed shortly thereafter and drove up and down the 
main street of Woodlake. He returned about 15 minutes 
later and learned that a neighbor had taken Mrs. Cornett and 
the children to the home of the decedent. He thereupon went 
to the home of the decedent and found him waiting on the 
front porch. The decedent greeted him and asked him if he 
wanted to come into the house. The defendant repJied t.hat 
his purpose in coming was merely to get the children, and 
that he wanted to hurry back to Woodlake, since it was 
getting late in the evening. As he appr6ached the door the 
decedent said, "Wait.," and looking back defendant saw that 
the decedent had drawn a gun and was pointing it at him. 
Defendant remonstrated with him and told him to put the gun 
away. Then he dashed back toward him and said, "Don't do 
that, Fred." The decedent thrust his left arm forth, and de-
fendant seized it. The decedent said," I am going to kill you," 
but defendant argued with him as he held his left arm and kept 
down the other hand in which the decedent held his gun. 
At this stage of his testimony defendant testified: "When 
1 kept on arguing with him to put the gun down-I s,'lid, 'Get 
~t off mI'. You don 'f want to kill me. J didn 'f. come here for 
iwy u(luble.' He said, 'Well, you've got a gun.' 1 said, • That '. 
) 
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ri~ht : PVi> got. n /:!l1n. hilt r'w~ r-otit h"ttnnp.<lllp, not ('Illt 1i!~1' 
,rOIlt')!. ITl' I::lid, • W('lI, go 011 in,' and raised the gun back 
on me. And I walked sideways, but I didn't get out of his 
reach through the door. Then we had another argument. 
I kept asking him to take it off and he kept telling me five 
or six times he was going to kill me." 
They finally entered the front room and proceeded up· 
stairs with defendant leading the way. As the decedent 
followed, he held his gun in his hand but did not point it 
directly at defendant. Both meu continued to swear and 
argue. Letla was near the head of the stair\vay looking down 
at them as they ascended. When they neared the head of 
the stairs, Letta ran down, Rtatin~ that she wonld call the 
police; the decedent replied that he would take c:!rc of his 
own job, and that he didn't require any policcmen. .After 
they had entered the uJlstairs room, the decedcut rai!:cJ hi" 
gUll toward the hips of defenuuJ1t. anll st.ated, "You better 
make your draw. 'I'his is your last chance. " 
Defendant testified that at that partieulnr tiIPA QIlly he, the 
decedent, and two Ilmall childrell, aged 3. :md ~, werc. 
in the room; and that the' two children were playing on the 
floor. His testimony continues: "I stepped about three steps 
to the foot of that bed and 1: looked baek and he was coming 
. ...on me with his gun like that. . . . A.'l he come that way on 
mc I turned my head on tile right. I wheeled right quick 
and made my draw and as I run into him I struck at him 
and hit his right arm and that kept him sideways and hig gun 
fell out of his hand on the floor. Aud the kids wsa in bctw,-en 
us and I jumped back and snapped a shot and fired again lUI 
he went do\VD." The shots "weren't over a second. They 
just follo\ved one another." 
After t.he decedent fell defendant placed his foot agtlinst 
his shoulder and pushed him over in order to 900 his face and 
said, "Fred, you made me s1100t you." Tht) docedent didn't 
answer. He picked up the decedent's gun so that the sYnall 
children would not hann themselve::; :md went dOWDstnir:.. 
Taking the two guns with him he left the house and wcut to 
Woodlake. 
Defendant denied that he had made a statcmcllt at hill 
cabin either to Mrs. Cornett or to his children about shootin(; 
the decedent. He further denied that he had stated to the 
decedent to make his last draw. but testified that the decedent 
himself had made such II l'ItatpnH .. "t to him. Hl' 91l'10 t('~tifh!d 
that when he was approached by the offiCCl'8 at Woodlakt: he 
Nov. 1945j PEOPLE V. CORNETT 
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dropped his gun immediately upon the first command; he 
denied that he had made an admission to the police officers that 
he had been wanting to kill the decedent for a long time. 
[1] Defendant contends that the trial court committed 
error in giving the following instruction on self-defense by 
including therein the words" absolutely necessary"; "The 
court instl."uets the jury that the mere apprehension of danber 
is insufficient to justify an as..<;ault with a deadly weapon. 
The fear if any must have been produced by circumstances 
such as would be sufficient to excite the fears of a reasonable 
person. The law of self-defense is founded on necessity, and 
ia order to justify the taking of life upon this ground it must 
not only appear to the person using the deadly weapon, as a 
rensonable man, that he had reason to believe, and "did believe, 
that he was in danger of his life, or of receiving great bodily 
harm, but it must also appear to his comprehension, as a rea-
Ronable man, that to avoid such danger, it was absolutely 
necessary for him to use the deadly weapon on the other 
party .... The court further instructs the jury that to 
justify the assault wi-!ha deadly weapon of another in self-
deiense, it must appear to the person using the deadly weapon, 
as a reasonable person, that the danger, if any, was so urgent 
and pressing that in order to save his own life or to prevent 
his receiving great bodily harm, the assault with the deadly 
weapon of the other was absolu,tely necessary. . . ." [Italics 
added.] The use of the term "absolutely necessary" in such 
iuc;tructions has been condemned, since it might have the effect 
of misleading jurors to believe that the right of self·defense 
can be asserted only if the act of killing was actually neces-
sary. (People v. Carmichael, 198 Cal. 534, 549 [246 P. 621.) 
Preceding the word "absolutely," however, the instruction 
indicates that "itmust~._.~ppea:r to. his comprehension, 
-as a reasonable man,· that to avoid danger" it was necessary 
for the defendant to take the life of another. Although the 
instruction when considered in its entirety shows that the 
taldng of life depends upon reasonable appearance to the 
defendant (People v. Holt, 25 Ca1.2d 59, 64 [153 P.2d 21] ; 
People v. Acosta, 21 Cal.App.2d 57, 61 [68 P.2d 298]), such 
an instruction should not be used because it might indicate 
to the jury that the right to self-defense is available only 
where the killing is absolutely necessary to save life. 
[2] The trial court erred in failing to give an instruction 
that the jury should have viewed with caution the oral admis. 
siona of defendant. Section 2061 (4) of the Code of Civil 
) 
) 
40 PltOPLB fl. CORNET'!' [33 C.2d 
. Procedure provides that a jury is "to be instructed on all 
proper occasions i that the testimony of an accomplice ought 
to be viewed with distrust, and the evidence of the oral ad-
missions of a party with eaution." It is clear that in view 
of the foregoing code section the trial cOurt should have 
given such a cautionary instruction. (People v. Koenig, 29 
Ca1.2d 87, 94 [173 P.2d 1] ; see People v. Thomas. 25 Ca1.2d 
880.891 [156 P.2d 7].) 
[3] The trial court also erred in giving the following in-
strnction: "There must be an intent to kill, but there need 
be, however, no appreciable space of time between the forming 
of the intent to kill and the overt act-they may be as in-
stantaneous as successive thoughts of the mind. A man may do 
a thing wilfully, deliberately and intentionally from a mo-
ment's reflection as well as after pondering over the subject 
for a month or a year. He' can premeditate, that is, think 
before doing the act, the moment he conceives the purpose, 
8S well as if the act was the result of long preeoncert or 
preparation." As held in People v. Bender, 27 Ca1.2d 164, 
182 [163P.2d 8}, and People v. Valentine. 28 Cal.2d 121. 
134 [169 P.2d 1], such a combination of instructions is wholly 
erroneous. C C Of course the instruction that there need be 'no 
appreciable space of time between the intention to kill and 
the act of killing . . .' is abstractly a correct statement of 
the law. It will be properly understood (at least upon delib-
f.ration) by thol"le learned in the law as referring only to the 
interval between the fully formulated intent and its execu-
tion, and a$ necessarily presupposing that trlte deliberation 
a.nd premeditation characterized the procell 01. and preceded 
tllUmate, IOf'mttlation 01 such intent •. _ But holding that 
Imch declaration is a correct statement of the abstract prin-
ciple of law is not a holding that the !lame declaration made . 
to 8 jury without explanation is not error. Particularly is it 
mi!:;leading when read in the oontext in which it was used. It 
f'xcludes from the required showing any deliberation and 
premeditation between the intent and the act of killing and 
~ince. other portions of the instructions eliminate any neces-
sity for deliberation or premeditation in forming the -intent 
(' He can premeditate ... the moment he eonceiveR the 
purpose . . .,' etc.), we find that the court has whol1y de-
lE.-ted the only difference, in this type of case, between first 
and s('cond degree murder." (People v. Bender, supra, 27 
Ca1.2d 164, 182-183.) To say that the defl'ndant "I~an pre-
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,-JudE'S the meaning of clm'flll thought and the wt'ighing of 
consioerations ('mbodicrl i," I he orrlinary dictionary meaning 
of "del ihcration" and "iircl11etiil at ion." (People v. Thomas, 
supra, 25 Ca1.2d 880, 898; People v. Bender, 27 Ca1.2d 164, 
183 [163 P.2d 8].) 
[4] The trial court, however, gave other instructions re-
lating to the meaning of .. deliberation and premeditation" 
essential for murder in the first degree: .. The law does not 
und.ertake to measure in units of time the length of the 
period during which the thought must be pondered before it 
can ripen into an intent to kill which is truly deliberate and 
premeditated. The time will vary with different individuals 
and under varying circumstances. The true test is not the 
duration of time, but rather the extent of the reflection. A 
cold, calculated judgment and decision may be arrived at in 
a short period of time, but a mere unconsidered and rash im-
pulse, ewn though it includes an intent to kill, is not su('h 
delibcratick and premeditation 8S will fix an unlawful killing 
as JUurder of the first rlegree. To constitute a ddibt·ratt· aud 
prl~meditated killing, thc )!luyer mnst weigh Bnd eon~ider the 
qUt'stion of killing and thp. reasons for :mrl azainst such a 
choice and, having in mind the eon!:leqnences, d.~cidc to :md 
cOJllmit the unlawful act cansing death." Al thon~:h thl' fore-
going instruction states the proper meaning of tbl~ <ldibcrat!Oll 
Ilnd premeditation required to f·stablish the offense of murder 
in the first degree, it did not cure the error, bl:t ifJstca<l crl':)tcd 
a, serious conflict in the in."lt.ructions. Wh,_ rl' it is impos!'Jihle 
to determine which of inconsistent instructionr, Wt'rt', followed 
by the jury, eonfiicting im;trllctions have bf~t'n h.-ld to con-
stitute reve1'llible errol':. -{People v. Dail, 22 C·tJ.2d 6";2, 6:;3 
{140 P.2d 828] ; Well.r v. Lloyd, 21 \Ca1.2d :152. ·lliS [1:12 P.2d 
4}'1].) It cannot rellsonably be said that thl' jury, even tllOn~h 
given tile proper instruction, was not misled by the further in-
struction that "a man lllay do a thing ... ddiber~tdy nnd 
intentionally from il motlJent's reflection. . .. He e:m pre-
meditate, that is, think before doing the al!t, the mOmt'llt he 
conceives tilt' purpose .... " The jury could find drf"lIIbnt 
guilty of murd{'r in the tirst dep.ree only by findin,,~ that th,~ 
m'nrdt'r was the rpslllt of deliberation and prcm"di~:tf i'Jll. 
since thl! killing did not take place during ihe (~omlllj~~ioll of 
thl' reloni,~ enumerated in It(!ction 189 of thc Penal Code. 
TJII, cyiul'ncc i .. without col1flil~t that defendant fired at tho 
dC<!t!fknt aftt'r whirling around from a pt;sition in which 
ho.: WWi I(loking behind a bed or screen. The jury could have 
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f'ollnrl rll'f'l'nrhlnt guilty of' Jnlll"IIl'r in thl' fll"l'It dl'grf!C on thr· 
ha!'lill IIf I,jtl"'r of the following finoillgs: (I) 14'olJowjlll~ UlP 
correct instruction it may have found that thc defendant had 
formed an intent to kill after carefully weighing and consider-
ing the question of killing, or that tire killing may have even 
been deliberated before his arrival at the home of the decc(knt; 
(2) it may have found that defendant Plltered the upstairs 
room without previously considering the question of shooting 
the decedent but that he conceived the thought "upon a 
momClnt's reflection" as he whirled around. In view of the 
e'ridence it is impossible to determine, thl'rdpre, wheth('r or 
not the jury reached its verdict on the basis of the correct in-
structions. Clearly the evidence under proper instructions 
would have supported a veruid of murder in the first degree; 
it is also clear, however, that it is rl~:tsonably probable that 
the jury, if it wa~ properly and unambiguously instructed, 
could find dcfend:mt guilty of murder of lesser degrtle, since 
it could have concluded that he shot the decedent as the result 
of a sudden impulse engendE'red by an argument that had 
taken place between thc two men, or by defendant's fear of 
his own life caused by the tense rdationship betwecn them 
at that time. 
[0] The trial court committed an even more serious error 
by instructing the jury in the language of Penal Codt' section 
1105 that "Upon a trial for murder, the commission of the 
homicide by the defendant being proved, the burden of prov-
ing circumstances of mitigation or that jm~tify or excuse it, 
devolves upon the defendant, unless the proof on the part of 
the prosecution tends to show that the crime committed only 
amounts to manslaughter or that the defendant was justifiablt' 
or excusable." (People v. Tkomiu, supra, 25 Cal.2d 880, 895.) 
This section does not set forth a rule relating to the burden of 
proof, but merely declares a rule of procedure that imposes 
on the defendant only a duty of going forward with the evi-
dence of mitigating circumstances. (Sec 9 So.Cal.L.Rev., 405, 
409.) It was held in several early cases that the defendant 
under this section has the burden of proving mitigating cir-
cumstances by a preponderance of the evidence. (People v. 
Hong Ak Duck, 6i Ca1. 387, 396; People v. Rate1l, 63 Cal. 
421, 422; People v. Arnold, 15 Cal. 476.) [6] It is now 
established, however, that thc defendant is not required to 
prove mitigating circumstances by a preponderance of the 
evidence, but need only introduce evidence of such circum-
stances to raise a reasonable doubt of his guilt. (People v. 
) 
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Bushton, 80 Cal. 160, 164 [22 P. 127, 549] ; People v. Elliott. 
80 Cal. 296, 305 [22 P. 207] ; People v. Post, 208 Cal. 433, 438 
[281 P. 618] ; People v. Wells, 10 Ca1.2d 610, 622 [76 P.2d 
493].) "The reading of section 1105 to the jurors without 
explaining to them thc extent of the burden cast upon defend-
ant \vould tend to creat<.> in their lllinds the impression that 
the obligation cast upon dcft'ndant was much greater than 
th<.> obligation cast upon him as defined by tbe late decisions 
of the Supreme Court. Since an erroneous view of section 
1105 was taken by the justices in the Hong Ah Duck and 
other cases it cannot be successfully argucd that thc jurors. 
wit.hout t.he aid of an cxplanatory instruction, could differen· 
tiate bctween the view expressed in the early California cast's 
and the view exprcssed in thp later cases and accurately de· 
termine the extent of the obligation ca.c;t upon dercnrlant." 
(People v. Carson, 43 Cal.App.2d 40, 44-45 [110 P.2d 98].) 
Thus, a jury may construe "the burden of proving circum· 
s~ces of mitigation" as imposing upon the defendant the 
burden of persuasion on this particular issue, and may believe 
that mitigating circumstances do not exist unless the defend· 
ant proves the existence of such circumstances by a preponder. 
anee of the evidence or by some othcr del,,'1'ee of proof. 
[7] Moreover, the instruction is erroneous in that the 
jury was not fully advised that such an instruction bas no 
application in determining the degree of murder, and that 
it is applicable only in determinillg whether the homicide con· 
stitutes murder or manslaughter, or is justifiable or excusable. 
(People v. Thomas, supra, 25 Cal.2d 880, 897; People v. 
Valentine, supra, 28 Ca1.2d 121, 133.) The expression "cir-
cumstanccs of mitigatlOn" is capaqle of an interpretation by 
a jury to include any circumstance that tends to reduce thc 
crime from murder in the first degree. Such an instruction 
therefore, while having no application in the determination 
of the degrees of luurder, may have the effect of indi<.>ating 
to the jury that a burden is imposed upon the defendant (if 
the evidence shows murder in the firgt degree) of showing 
mitigating circumstances to prove murder in the second de· 
greer It may have the effect of foreclosing any consideration 
by the jury that mitigating cirCulllstnnces, although not suffi· 
cient in law to justify or exCUse the homicide, may be enough 
to reduce the crime to second degree murder by counteracting 
the element of premeditation or deliberation. Thus, a con· 
, seientious jury, misled by the instruction, lIlny bdievt: that if 
: the defendant does not satisfy the buruen of pergua:;ion relat-
) 
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ing to mitigating circnmstances, it no longer has to conRider 
such circumstances in its deliberations. Furthermore, "logic 
Huggests that since such section in reality merely declares a 
rule of procedure and does 110t relieve the state of the burden 
of proving each and every essential element 'of guilt beyond 
a reasonable doubt the propriety of reading it to the jury, 
even with a proper explanation, is doubtful." (People v. 
Thomas, supra, 25 Cal.2d 880, 896.) 
[8] It may be contended that this instruction, though 
erroneous, could not have prejudiced defendant. Such an 
instruction may not be prejudici31, if the jury is adequately 
instructed in connection with instructions relating to mitigat-
ing circumstances, that the prosecution has the burden 
throughout the entire trial to prove every element of the 
crime beyond a reasonable douht,. and that the burdpu of 
persnasion never shifts to the defendant. (See People v. 
Leddy, 95 Cal.App. 659, 672 [273 P. 110] ; People v. Richards, 
1 Cal.App. 566, 572 [82 P. 691] ; People v. Hawes, 98 Cal. 
648,653 [33 P. 791].) Although the trial court gave the usual 
instructions relating to the presumptions of innocence and 
the burden of the prosecution to prove every element of thc 
crime beyond a reasonable doubt, such instructions did not 
render the erroneous instruction harmless. Since thC!Se in-
structions were not given in connection with the instructions 
relating to the lnitigating circumstances, they did not clarify 
the confusion likely to result from the reading of section 
1105. The jury might have concluded that an instruction 
based on the language of section 1105, which was given in con-
junction with the general instructions on self-defense, created 
an exception to the rule that to be entitled to an acquittal 
the defendant must only create a reasonable doubt in the 
minds of the jurors. (People v. MarshalZ, 112 Cal. 422, 425-
426 [44P. 718].) I 
Since defendant admitted the killing and claimed that the 
shooting was done in self-defense, the giving of the erroneous 
instruction appears particularly prejudicial. (People v. Roe, 
189 Cal. 548, 565 [209 P. 560]; People v. Marshall, supra, 
112 Cal. 422, 425; People v. Post, Sttpra, 208 Cal. 433, 438-
4:19.) Defendant was entitled to have the jury in resolving 
the conflict in the evidence apply to his testimony the rule as 
to reasonable doubt. 'fhe jury following an erroneous view 
of defendant's burden may have believed that after the prose-
cution had completed its case the burden shifted upon defend-
ant to prove that the homicide was excusable. Accordingly, 
J 
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it may ha"e conehldl'd that dl!felldnnt by his tf'stlmony fnih'li 
to sustain the burden of penmnsion on t.his issue. That tPsli· 
mon('y, however, even though 1I0t enough in the minds of tilt> 
jurors to prove seU-defense, might have been sufficient to 
raise a reasonable doubt in their minds. Since defendant was 
required by the erroneous instruction to produce more evi-
dence than the law demands to establish his defense, he was in 
i effect deprived of the force of his testimony. Tbus, it canllot 
~ reasonably be said that it is improbable that the jury would 
ti bave reached a different res~t had they been properly in-
t structed that defendant was required only to raise a reason-
t· able doubt on the issue of self-defense. Such all instruction 
t therefore may have mislpd the jury on a matter vital to the 
t-
~' defense of defendant. (See People v. Silver, 16 Cal.2d 714, 
~'.' 723 [108 P.2d 41; People v. Dail, supra, 22 Cal.2d 642, 659.) 
~ After a consideration of the entire record it is clear that the 
~ giving of tbil; erron<'ous instruction, particularly when con-
t Jliderec1 wit.h tbe other erroneous instructions, has resulted in t a ruiscarrin~e of justice. I ' """ -'."'.' """-" 
( The jud~!Ilcnt and' the order denying the motion for new 
i trial arlO reversl~(l. 
Gibson, C. J., Carter, J., Schauer, J., and Spence, J.,con~ 
curred. ' 
